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PAYEES AS HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE
RALPH W. AiGLER
While it is now too late to hope for uniformity of judicial
view on the problem of payees as holders in due course ' without
some revision of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,2
the question is still an open one in a considerable number of
states.
Only infrequently have courts given any attention to the back-
ground of the problem; they have been disposed to seize upon
certain language in the Act, some of it pointing to one conclu-
sion and some to the opposite, or to be content with the adoption
of one of the two views expressed in two or three conspicuous
cases decided under the statute. Where the statutory language
is clear, courts ought to apply it without regard to the earlier
case law of the jurisdiction, but in the case of expressions sus-
ceptible of more than one meaning, then it surely is not only
proper but necessary to look outside the statutory language.3
I This question is discussed in (1908) 13 L. R. A. (N. s.) 490; L. R. A.
1915 B, 144; (1921) 15 A. L. R. 437; (1922) 21 A. L. R. 1365; (1923) 26
A. L. R.'769; (1924) 32 A. L. R. 289; Hening, The Uniform Negotiable
Instr'uments Law (1911) 59 U. PA. L. REv. 471; (1916) 64 ibid. 318;
(1921) 70 ibid. 52; (1922) 10 CALIF. L. REV. 413; (1915) 24 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 429; (1918-19) 28 ibid. 197, 710; (1917) 30 HARV. L. Rv. 515;
(1922) 20 MicH. L. REv. 908; (1923) 21 ibid. 591; (1924) 22 ibid. 581;
(1923) 18 ILL. L. RE V. 47; (1924) 9 MINN. L. REV. 101.
2 Certainly the effort toward uniformity has never been more appropriate
than in the field of negotiable paper. The Uniforrj Act in this respect
has been productive of much good. No doubt it was too much to expect
that any group of human beings would be able to prepare a statute that
would be interpreted uniformly in more than four dozen jurisdictions, par-
ticularly in view of the fact that the statute did not purport to be a codi-
fication of the existing law even of one of those jurisdictions. With the
experience of thirty years in dealing with the Uniform Act now available
it is believed that the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws could well
go back to one of their earliest and most important pieces of work and
make an attempt to draft suggested amendments to cover difficulties that
now appear so clearly.
3 In Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros. [1891] A. C. 107, 144, Lord Her-
schell said: "I think the proper course is in the first instance to examine
the language of the statute and to ask what is its natural meaning, unin-
fluenced by any considerations derived from the previous state of the law,
and not to start with inquiring how the law previously stood, and then,
assuming that it was probably intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the
words of the enactment will bear an interpretation in conformity with
this view.
"If a statute, intended to embody in a code a particular branch of the
law, is to be treated in this fashion, it appears to me its utility will be
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As will be more fully pointed out later on, the legislative lan-
guage leaves open the problem now under consideration. Ac-
cordingly it seems appropriate to begin with a study of the case
law as it was prior to the Bills of Exchange Act in England.4
According to the early writers on bills of exchange, there
ordinarily were four parties to an exchange transaction-
drawer, remitter, drawee and payee.5 Though this practice is
no longer so general, it having become increasingly common for
the one desirous of transmitting credit to take the bill in his own
name which he then indorses over to the one to be put in funds,
it is still far from unusual for the transaction to take the earlier
form. Many of the cases raising the question as to the payee
being a holder in due course arise out of such situations.
It was fully recognized by the English courts, prior to the
Bills of Exchange Act, that a payee in a bill of exchange who
took bona fide and for value from a remitter not a party to the
instrument was protected as against defenses that might have
been available in favor of the drawer against the remitter, had
the latter been a party to the document and claimed to recover
thereon.
The position of the payee who has received a bill in good faith
almost entirely destroyed, and the very object with which it was enacted
will be frustrated. The purpose of such a statute [the Bills of Exchange
Act (1882) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61.] surely was that on any point specifically
dealt with by it, the law should be ascertained by interpreting the language
used, instead of, as before, by roaming over a vast number of authori-
ties in order to discover what the law was, extracting it by a minute criti-
cal examination of the prior decisions, dependent upon a knowledge of
the exact effect even of an obsolete proceeding such as a demurrer to evi-
dence. I am of course far from asserting that resort may never be had
to the previous state of the law for the purpose of aiding in the con-
struction of the provisions of the code. If, for example, a provision be
of doubtful import, such resort would be perfectly legitimate. Or, again,
if in a code of the law of negotiable instruments words be found which
have previously acquired a technical meaning, or been used in a sense other
than their ordinary one, in relation to such instruments, the same inter-
pretation might well be put upon them in the code."
Thompson, J., in Nat'l City Bank. v. Nat'l Bank of the Republic, 300
Ill. 103, 107, 132 N. E. 832, 833 (1921): "The law [N.I.L.J was enacted
for the purpose of furnishing in itself a certain guide for the determina-
tion of all questions covered thereby relating to commercial paper, and,
so far as it speaks without ambiguity as to any such question, reference
to case law as it existed prior to the enactment is more likely to be mis-
leading than beneficial."
4 The provisions of the American legislation in this respect are, generally
speaking, obviously taken from the English Act.
S"Ordinarily there are four persons requisite to be employed in the
taking up or remitting any parcel of money by Exchange, (besides the
broker which doth procure the parcel) as namely, two at the place where
the money is taken up, and two at the place where the money is payable."
m rAus, BILLS OF EXCHANGE (4th ed. 1684) 3. See also BEAwEs, LE
MERCATORIA (2d ed. 1761) 416 (bills of exchange).
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and for value from a remitter was thoroughly examined by the
English court in litigation developing out of the failure of the
house of Coates & Company. In Munroe v. Bordier, a bill had
been drawn by the defendant in London, at the request of
,Coates & Company, on a drawee in France in favor of the
plaintiff. This bill was turned over to Coates & Company
without consideration, it being the understanding that payment
by the latter should be made to the defendant on the next foreign
post-day. The bill was forwarded to the plaintiff in France
who took for value and in good faith. The bill having been
dishonored and notice given, action was brought against the
defendant, the drawer. The defense relied on was that Coates
& Company had failed before the next foreign post-day and had
never paid for the bill. The Court of Common Pleas concluded
that the defense was unavailable against the plaintiff. After
pointing out that the ordinary course of dealing in the case of
foreign bills begins with a sale of the bill by the drawer to
some person other than the payee; that it is not, therefore,
,contemplated "that the consideration for the bill should neces-
sarily move from the payee to the drawer, or that no person
but the drawer should have a right to confer a title to the bill
-upon the payee"; and in this case the plaintiff had taken the
instrument from Coates & Company for value, bona fide, Wilde,
C. J., reached the conclusion that the plaintiff, payee in the bill,
should recover.8 The case of Puget de Bras v. Forbes, which
had been confidently relied upon by the defendant, was dis-
tinguished on the ground that in that case the one who procured
the bill to be issued by the defendant (drawer) was acting as
an agent of the plaintiff (payee).
In Poirier v. Morris,1° Coates & Company had procured on
behalf of an American firm another bill on France under cir-
cumstances much like those in Munroe v. Bordier. There, too,
after dishonor, the payee sued the drawer and the defense of
lack of consideration was interposed. The conclusion of the
Court of Queens Bench was the same as that reached by the
G8 C. B. 862 (1849).
7Supra note 6, at 871. This point of view, that the remitter is in a posi-
tion "to confer a title to the bill upon the payee," is deeply significant. It
will be referred to later on.
8 Arguendo the court said further: "Suppose the bill . . . had been
given to them, made payable to the plaintiffs, in order that they, Coates &
Co., might borrow money upon it, or hand it over to the payees, in dis-
charge of a debt, surely the payees, in either case, might sue upon the
instrument, without proving the giving of value to the drawer or maker.
The want of such value could not be relied upon as an answer to the ac-
tion, on the ground of the contract between the immediate parties to the
instrument being nudum pactum, " Supra note 6, at 873.
9 1 Esp. 117 (C. P. 1792).
10 2 El. & El. 89 (Q. B. 1853).
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Common Pleas in the earlier case, the remitter again being
looked upon as a purchaser of the bill, title to which was con-
ferred by him upon the payee who took for value and in good
faith, thereby making any defense, such as lack of consideration,
unavailable against him.
In Watson v. Russell,11 the same view is applied on these facts:
the plaintiff drew a check in favor of the defendant at the re-
quest of K, and handed the instrument to the latter on the
understanding that it was to go to the defendant, with a state-
ment that it was to be used only in consideration that a certain
ship managed by the defendant should be allowed to go on a
certain voyage. The check was delivered by K to the defendant
in part payment of a debt without the accompanying message,
and the money was collected thereon. In an action by the plain-
tiff to compel the defendant to refund, the latter was held to be
in as good position as if he were suing the plaintiff on the
instrument. The court said: 12
"If A., by means of a false pretence or a promise or condition
which he does not fulfil, procures B. to give him a note or check
or acceptance in favour of 0., to whom he pays it, and who
receives it bon& fide for value, B. remains liable on his accept-
ance. His acceptance imports value and liability prima facie,
and he can only relieve himself from his promise to pay C. by
showing that C. is not holder for value, or that he received the
instrument with notice or not bona fide. The instrument is
one which C. has a right to take, relying on the acceptance or
making of the party, and it is no answer to say that'there is no
consideration as between him and the acceptor or maker, if the
holder took it bonA fide for value."
The ground of these decisions seems entirely free of doubt.
The bill is deemed to be the property of the remitter and it is
by and through him that ownership comes to the payee, who, if
he is a bona fide holder for value,' 3 will, on familiar principles
of the law of negotiable paper, take free of certain defenses.
Although the drawer and payee appear on the instrument to be
"immediate parties," in truth they are not; the payee, instead of
taking as promisee more truly takes as a purchaser. And there
were no intimations of any contrary opinion.
113 B. & S. 34 (Q. B. 1862), aff'd 5 B. & S. 968 (Ex. Ch. 1865).
12 3 B. & S. 34, at 38.
3'"Holder in due course," which has come into general use under the
Bills of Exchange Act and the Negotiable Instruments Law, is the equiv-
alent of the longer expression, used before the legislation, "a bona fide
holder for value and without notice." Lewis v. Clay, 67 L. J. Q. B. 224,
228 (1898) per Lord Russell: ". . . the bona fide holder for value with-
out notice, or the holder in due course as he is now called." Herdman v.
Wheeler [1902] 1. K. B. 361, 370, per Channell, J.
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In a number of cases 14 language had been used which was
susceptible of an indication, one way or another, of the rights of
a payee to collect on paper signed in blank or incomplete in
some material particular when signed. But these pronounce-
ments were by no means definite or authoritative. As said by
Channel, J., in a case decided after the statute,' "The cases
quoted by the defendant on the argument do not appear, there-
fore, to help him very much; but, on the other hand, the in-
vestigation of the law before the Bills of Exchange Act appears
to shew that there is no case which would be a distinct authority
in favour of the plaintiff if the law were still as before the Bills
of Exchange Act. The law has been stated by various judges 10
in general terms in such way as to cover the case 7 but they do
not appear to have had their attention specially drawn to the
point" [notes ours].
Occasion for misapprehension as to the true principle involved
in some of these decisions was given by the use of language in
the opinions suggestive of estoppel."" As will be pointed out
later on, there may be situations in which liability may be
fastened upon one or defenses be made unavailable by estoppel,
but it certainly is a mistake to attempt to explain the protection
of the bona fide purchaser of commercial paper by the doctrines
of estoppel. It is, of course, familiar law that as against a
holder in due course many defenses are not open, and it is not
surprising that frequently the result is expressed in language
that may be associated normally with an estoppel. It is said,
24 See Garrard v. Lewis, 10 Q. B. D. 30 (1882); France v. Clarke, 26
Ch. D. 257 (1884); Crutchly v. Mann, 5 Taunt. 529 (1814); Harvey v.
Cane, 34 L. T. R. (x. s.) 64 (1876); Awde v. Dixon, 6 Ex. 869 (1851). In
the case first cited, Bowen, J., said, at 35: "I arrive at the conclusion
that a man who gives his acceptance in blank holds out the person
to whom it is intrusted as clothed with ostensible authority to fill in the
bill as he pleases within the limits of the stamp, and that no alteration
(even if it be fraudulent and unauthorized) of the marginal figure vitiates
the bill as a bill for the full amount inserted in the body, when the bill
reaches the hands of a holder who is unaware that the marginal index
has been improperly altered." In France v. Clarke, Lord Selbourne said,
at 262: "The person who has signed a negotiable instrument in blank, or
with blank spaces, is (on account of the negotiable character of that in-
strument) estopped by the law merchant from disputing any alteration
made in the document, after it has left his hands, by filling up blanks (or
otherwise in a way not ex facie fraudulent) as against a bond fide holder
for value without notice; but'it has been repeatedly explained that this
estoppel is in favor only of such a bona fide holder."
5Herdman v. Wheeler, supra note 13, at 369.
16 See supra note 14.
17 The court was considering the position of a bona fide payee for value
who had taken a note improperly filled in by one supposed by the payee
to have been the maker's agent.
is See, for example, the quotations supra note 14.
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for example, "the defendant is not permitted" to defend on a
certain ground, or "he is barred by the instrument coming to
the hands of a holder in due course," or even, "The person who
has signed . . . in blank . . . is (on account of the
negotiable character of that instrument) estopped by the law
merchant from disputing any alteration." 10 Though the doc-
trines under which bona fide purchasers of negotiable paper and
property generally are protected against defenses and equitable
charges in some respects rather closely parallel the principles
of estoppel, it certainly is vital to clear thinking that the two
concepts be kept distinct. As will be pointed out later on, the
unusual protection given innocent takers of commercial paper
is due to an application of the principles of bona fide purchase
of property, rather than to any extension of the doctrines of
estoppel.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT
This was the state of the English case law when in 1882 the
Bills of Exchange Act became law. The Act contains language,
so far as it bears on the question under examination, essentially
the same as that found in the American legislation recommended
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws nearly fifteen
years later. The English statute =1 contains the following:
"§ 2---'Holder' means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note
who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof."
"§ 29 (1)-A holder in due course is a holder who has taken
a bill . . . under the following conditions, namely, .
"(b) -That he took the bill in good faith and for value, and
that at the time the bill was negotiated to him he had no notice
of any defect in the title," etc.
"§ 31 (1)-A bill is negotiated when it is transferred from
one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the
transferee the holder of the bill."
"(2)--A bill payable to bearer is negotiated by delivery.
"(3)- A bill payable to order is negotiated by the indorsement
of the holder completed by delivery."
These are the general provisions that would seem to be in-
volved whenever a payee claims to stand as a holder in due
course. In addition to these, there are certain other provisions
that may be invoked when the question presented involves a
particular point. By section 20 it is provided that blanks must
be filled up within a reasonable time and strictly in accordance
with the authority given, with the proviso, however, "that if any
such instrument after completion is negotiated to a holder in
i9 Lord Selbourne, in France v. Clarke, svzpra note 14, at 262.
20 (1882) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61.
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due course it shall be valid . . . as if it had been filled up
strictly in accordance with the authority given." As to
delivery, it is provided in section 21 (2) that "As between im-
mediate parties, and as regards a remote party other than a
holder in due course, the delivery [must be by or under the
authority of a proper party]. But if the bill be in the hands
of a holder in due course a valid delivery of the bill by all
parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is con-
clusively presumed."
Perhaps it should also be noted here that the Bills of Exchange
Act is the result of a deliberate effort to codify the law of
England. Only in a few conspicuous instances was it designed
to change the law of bills of exchange, promissor notes and
checks. 21 In this country it is equally clear that while the aim
of the Negotiable Instruments Law was uniformity among the
many jurisdictions in the law of negotiable instruments, this
end was to be attained by codification, not of the law of any
one jurisdiction, but generally.22
The first English case after the statute with any expression
of opinion as to the status of a payee as a holder in due course,
unfortunately was one in which the problem was not involved,
the views advanced being quite unnecessary to a conclusion on
the facts. In Lewis v. Clay,23 the defense by one of two joint
makers of a promissory note to an action by the payee was that
his signature had been obtained by a representation by the co-
maker that the instrument signed was of an entirely different
character. The court sustained the defense under the doctrine of
the well known case of Foster v. Mackinnon.24 It was pointed
out by Lord Russell that even if the defendant had been careless
in signing, which it was concluded he was not, the plaintiff could
not recover because although he took for value and without
notice, being the payee, an immediate party, he could not claim
as a holder in due course under the Bills of Exchange Act.21
21 See remarks by Chalmers in the Introduction to CHALAIERS, BILLS OF
EXCHANGE (8th ed. 1919) xl.
22 The preparation and reception of the legislation were therefore cor-
respondingly more difficult. In framing the proposed statute there was
the problem of choice from conflicting views, and in application by the
courts after enactment, there was the inevitable tendency to adhere to what
had theretofore been decided on in that jurisdiction unless the language of
the statute was so explicit as to leave no choice. Although there have been
noteworthy exceptions, there has been manifested by the courts of the va-
rious states a commendable spirit of co-operation in securing uniformity.
23 Supra note 13.
24 L. R. 4 C. P. 704 (1869).
25 In Lewis v. Clay, supra note 13, at 227, Lord Russell said: "It will
be apparent from a consideration of the facts of the case that the plaintiff
was not a 'holder in due course' at all, but that he was, in fact, simply
the named payee of two promissory notes. Further, an examination of
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That this case is of little significance on the question under
consideration is obvious. In the first place, there was no deci-
sion on the point, and in the second, the payee here took directly
from one of two co-makers; the payee was an immediate party
not only in form, but also in substance.
The dictum in Lewis v. Clay occasioned considerable comment
by the court in Herdnw v. Wlzeeler.20 In that case the de-
fendant signed a blank form of promissory note and placed it
in the hands of A, who was to make the loan to the defendant.
Purporting to get it on behalf of the defendant, A applied to
the plainfiff for a loan in excess of the amount agreed upon
between A and the defendant. The plaintiff having indicated
his willingness, the note was filled in with the plaintiff's name
as payee and an amount twice that agreed upon. The money
was advanced by the plaintiff to A (supposedly for the defen-
dant) in good faith, but the defendant never received any of it.
In an action on the note the plaintiff sought to prevail over the
defense that the completion of the note was contrary to the
authority given, by claiming as a holder in due course. It was
in this case that Channell, J., after a review of the cases prior
to the Bills of Exchange Act, pointed out:!' that in respect of
the position of a payee against whom is interposed the defense
of improper filling of blanks, the law, when the statute was
framed, was unsettled, though expressions of the courts pointing
either way might be found. He concluded that while under the
Act it was perfectly possible that a payee should be a holder in
due course,2 S it could not be said on the facts before the court
that "after completion" the note in question had been "negotiated
to a holder in due course."
sections . . . will make it quite clear that 'a holder in due course'
is a person to whom, after its completion by and as between the immediate
parties, the bill or note has been negotiated. In the present case the
plaintiff is named as payee on the face of the promissory note, and there-
fore is one of the immediate parties. The promissory notes have, in fact,
never been negotiated within the meaning of the Act."2 6 Supra note 13.
27 Supra page 612.
2 8 Reference was made by Channell, J., to the language of Lord Rusell
in Lewis v. Clay, supra note 13, as follows: "It is quite clear, therefore,
that the ex\pression of opinion of the late Lord Chief Justice that a payee
was never a holder in due course was a dictum only, and, moreover, as his
remarks on the other part of the case appear quite unanswerable, the case
could not well have been appealed, and, in fact, was not appealed; so that
his dictum could not well be questioned in that case. It appears to us
that the late Lord Chief Justice overlooked the definition of holder in s. 2,
which is, 'Holder means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in
possession of it, or the bearer thereof.' Therefore, in s. 29, it is neces-
sary to read holder as including payee as well as indorsee, and to read it
'a holder in due course is a payee or indorsee who: &c. That being so, the
only words in s. 29 which can be said to indicate that a payee cannot be
YALE LAW JOURNAL
To the argument that by section 31 of the Act it is provided
"a bill is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to
another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the
holder of .the bill," the court addressed these questions: "Does
this mean only from one person who is holder to another, or may
the person transferring be an agent in possession of the bill
otherwise than as holder, whose delivery constitutes the receiver
a holder? And even if that cannot be the meaning in the 31st
section, may it not be possible to say that in the 20th section
'negotiated to a holder in due course' means no more than de-
livered to a person in such a way that he thereupon becomes
a holder in due course?" 29 The court's answer to these ques-
tions is deeply significant in its bearing on the fundamental
question of this paper. It was said: 30
. . .Even if the payee of a note may be a holder in due
course, the question whether he is or not depends upon the actual
state of facts as between him and the maker of the note; and
the contract between the payee and the maker, though no doubt
it has some incidents, such, for instance, as days of grace
written into it by the law merchant, yet is governed more by the
ordinary law of contracts than by the law merchant, and in
particular that the element of negotiability in no way enters
into the contract between maker and payee. There is much to
support this argument in the Bills of Exchange Act. .
Payees and holders not in due course are, therefore, put on the
same footing as regards proof of authority of the person
handing them the bill."
This case, then, which has been so frequently cited for the
position that payees may not be holders in due course, instead
of so deciding, expressly declares the contrary to be the fact;
the conclusion is reached merely that within the meaning of
the proviso to the 20th section of the Bills of Exchange Act
(last sentence of section 14 of the N. I. L.) there had been,
after completion, no negotiation to a holder in due course. And
this view is arrived at because it was considered that the maker
(defendant) and payee (plaintiff) were immediate parties to
the contract. Therefore the general principles of contract law
should govern. It is to be noted that the intermediate party, A,
a holder in due course are those in sub-s. (b) : 'and that at the time the
bill was negotiated to him he had no notice of any defect in the title of the
person who negotiated it.' But if the word 'payee' had been expressed in
the earlier part of the section, it would be clear that this means 'if ne-
gotiated to him he had at the time no notice,' &c. On the whole, therefore,
we are not prepared to hold that a payee of a note can never be a holder
in due course; but it is, as it seems to us, just as unnecessary for us to
decide that question as it was for the late Lord Chief Justice to do so in
the case before him."
29 Herdman v. Wheeler, supra note 13, at 373.
30 Ibid. 374.
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at no time even pretended to be the owner of the instrument;
the plaintiff dealt with him as an agent of the other party to
the promise.
The force of this decision even thus narrowed is, however,
much weakened by the observations of the judges of the Court
of Appeal in Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke,31 a case in which the defen-
dant after signing notes in blank for the accommodation of C,
intrusted them to him on the understanding that they were to
be filled in with certain amounts payable to the plaintiff. Con-
trary to the authority, C filled in a larger sum and the plaintiff
took innocently and for value. The court found for the plaintiff
on the ground that the defendant was estopped -by his conduct
to raise the question of the filling in being contrary to authority.
Collins, Al. R., voted for the plaintiff on the ground of estoppel
saying that it was quite unnecessary to express any opinion as
to the soundness of Heedintr v. Wheeler. Cozens-Hardy, L. J.,
agreed, but said he wanted to keep an open mind as to the earlier
case. Fletcher Moulton, L. J., also agreed in the decision, point-
ing out, however, that the result might very well be reached on
the ground that plaintiff, though a payee, was a holder in due
course. He said that the law was clearly so before the Bills of
Exchange Act and that no change had been wrought thereby.
In later cases it seems to be assumed that a payee may be a
holder in due course, even under the proviso to the 20th section. 3
One more case under the Bills of Exchange Act is strictly
in point. In Gunns Ltd. 'v. Wark,3" a purchaser of fertilizer
from a dealer gave a promissory note for the purchase price at
the request of the dealer, payable to the manufacturer to whom
the dealer was indebted. In an action on the note by the payee
against the maker, it was held that the defense of failure of
consideration was not available against the plaintiff, a holder
in due course. Reliance was placed upon the doctrine of Watson
v. Russell: "If A, by means of a false pretence or a promise or
condition which he does not fulfil, procures B to give him a note
-or cheque or acceptance in favour of C to whom he pays it, and
who receives it bonwa fide for value, B remains liable on his ac-
ceptance."
The draftsman of the Bills of Exchange Act points out that
31 [1907] 1 K. B. 794.
32 Doubt was expressed as to whether the doctrine of estoppel was ap-
plicable to the facts of Herdman v. Wheeler, supra note 13.
13 Glenie v. Bruce Smith [1908] 1. K. B. 263, per Fletcher Moulton; Tal-
bot v. Von Boris [1911] 1 K. B. 854; Jones Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow Ltd.
E1925] 2 K. B. 612. The last cited case has, however, been reversed by
the House of Lords, it being said that Lord Russell's view in Lewis v.
Clay, supra note 13, was sound. [1926] A. C. 670.
34 51 New Brun. 292 (1924).
sr Loc. cit. supra note 12.
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"any defense available against an immediate party is available
against a remote party who is in privity with such immediate
party"; and that "'Immediate parties' are parties in direct rela-
tion with each other. All other parties are remote. Prim4
facie, the drawer and acceptor, the drawer and the payee, the
indorser and his indorsee, are in direct relation." He then
uses the following example: 36
"2. B. makes a note payable to C. Prim& facie B. and C. are,
immediate parties; but if it appear that B. made the note at the
request of X. under the belief that he had done something which
he had not done, and that X. on his own account delivered the
note to C., who gave value and took it without notice, then B.
and C. are remote parties. Aliter, if X. had been C's. agent."
Until very recently, therefore, there has been little reason to
feel doubt as to the status of the English law either before or
under the Act. If the payee and maker, either by themselves
or through agents, are not really contracting with each other,
the payee may well be entitled to the advantages accorded a
holder in due course. To the contrary there is the dictum of
Lord Russell in Lewis v. Clay and the view expressed by the
Divisional Court in Herdman v. Wheeler. In the latter case,
however, the decision was limited to the proviso to section 20
(N. I. L., § 14) i.e. if "after completion" the instrument is
"negotiated to a holder in due course," it being explicitly stated
that according to the language of the act a payee may be a
holder in due course. The weight of this decision even thus
confined was considerably affected by the language of the Court
of Appeal in the later cases above noted.
In the case of Jones, Ltd. v. Waring and Gillow, Ltd.37 in the,
House of Lords, there are expressions of opinion that make it
difficult to maintain that under the Bills of Exchange Act a payee,
may Ue a holder in due course. The case grew out of the fol-
lowing facts: By false representations B procured from the
plaintiffs their check. One of the false representations being
that the defendants, well known to the plaintiffs, were engaged
with B in a certain fictitious venture, the check was made pay-
able directly to the defendants. In truth B was indebted to the
defendants and he turned the check over to them to apply on
that debt, their taking being in good faith. Because of a de-
fective execution of the check another in like amount was sub-
stituted by the plaintiffs, the new check, as was the old, being
payable to the defendants, and they collected the amount therein
called for. On the discovery of the facts, action was brought
to recover the amount collected by the defendants on the check,
3r CHALmERS, op. cit. supra note 21, at 111, 112.
3 Supra note 33.
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the theory of the plaintiffs being in the alternative-money paid
by mistake or on a consideration which failed. Darling, L. J.,
allowed recovery on the first ground. The Court of Appeal
(Pollock, IM. R., and Scrutton and Sargant, L. iJ.) reversed
the judgment, but in the House of Lords a majority were of the
opinion that Lord Darling's conclusion should be upheld. All
the Lords who heard the appeal agreed that the defendants were
not ones to whom the check had been "negotiated" so as to stand
as holders in due course and therefore free of the plaintiffs'
claim. Lord Shaw of Dunfermline put it: S "The cheque never
went into the circle by transfer or indorsation, and it is in these
circumstances, in my opinion, inappropriate to use language as
to 'a holder in due course' as applicable to the position of a direct
payee of a cheque." The view of Lord Russell in Lcwis v. Clay
on this point was approved and the contrary opinion of Fletcher
Moulton, L. J., in Lloyds Baizk v. Cooke was rejected.
Of course, the decision in the Jones case is only on its facts,
and they presented an unusual situation. 'While the defendants
took the check as a payment by B the plaintiffs never intended
B to have any interest therein; the plaintiff intended to deal with
the defendants, and the check on which the money was paid was
given by the plaintiffs directly to the defendants. However this
may be, the generality of the language as to the situation of a
payee under the Bills of Exchange Act leaves it very difficult for
any other and therefore inferior English court to reach what
is believed to be the sound conclusion.
EARLY AIMERICAN CASES
In the United States, until about ten years after the N. I. L.,
the development of the law on this subject generally paralleled
its course in England. Prior to the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
-ments Law, the cases and writers were pretty well agreed that
a position as payee did not necessarily mean that one could not
stand as a holder in due course, to use the expression which
came into common use after the legislation.23 In the cases cited,
38 [1926] A. C. 670, at 687.
39 Cagle v. Lane, 49 Ark 465 (1837); So. Boston Iron Co. v. Brown, 63
Ale. 139 (1873); Glasscock v. Rand, 14 Mo. 550 (1851); Jordan v. Jordan,
'78 Tenn. 124 (1832) ; Lookout Bank v. Aull, 93 Tenn. 645, 27 S. W. 1014
(1894); Armstrong v. Bank, 133 U. S. 433, 10 Sup. Ct. 450 (1890); Pas-
sumpsic Bank v. Goss, 31 Vt. 315 (1858); DiMon v. Dixon, '1 Vt 450
(1859); F. & Al. Bank v. Humphrey, 36 Vt. 554 (1864); Frank & Adler v.
Iilienfeld, 33 Gratt. 377 (Va. 1880); 1 DANiEL, NEGOTABLE INSTnUrIETS
(6th ed. 1913) § 175; 1 PARSONS, NOTES AND BMLS (1S73) 181. But sea
Chariton Plow Co. v. Davidson, 16 Neb. 374, 20 N. W. 250 (1834).
In 1 DANIEL, loc. cit. supra, it is said, "Who are the immediate parties
-to a bill or note, however, does not always appear on its face. The name
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the conclusion was reached over a variety of defenses as, for
example, lack or failure of consideration, negotiation contrary
to understanding or without procuring signatures of additional
parties as agreed, etc. In some of them, no doubt, the decisions
were, or might have been, rested wholly or in part on other
grounds. The recognition of the doctrine of the English deci-
sions along this line is, however, clear, such cases as Munroe V.
Bordier, Poirer v. Moris and Watson v. Russell being frequently
relied upon.
Before considering the statutory language and the cases that
have been decided in this country since the N. I. L., it may be
helpful to give some attention to what fairly appear to have
been the considerations underlying the then generally accepted
doctrines, when the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
undertook the task of framing a comprehensive code.
Bills of exchange, the common use of which has been due
largely to the need for some convenient and safe means of trans-
ferring credits without the trouble and danger of handling
money or other valuable property, have frequently been likened
to money, and much of the law of such documents is due to the
desire to make them circulable much like money. Although
promissory notes have not quite the same reason for their origin
and development, the disposition has been strong, particularly
since the Statute of Anne,40 to deal with them as upon the same
footing at least so far as their circulation is concerned.
Now the law of bills and notes is an interesting combination
of well known principles of contract and property law, modified
sometimes to suit the peculiar conditions involved in problems
of commercial paper. The obligations of parties to such paper
are essentially promissory, and holders thereof must necessarily
proceed for realization on the paper as upon promises. As a
matter of contract law, it was too clear for argument that the
rights of any successor to the promisee were no greater than
those of the promisee himself. Indeed it was not easy for the
assignee of the promises to claim even as much as could the
promisee himself. And the claims of the promisee were clearly
subject to any infirmities in the promissory obligation. In other
words, that any defense to an action on the promise should not be
open for the promisor to make was not even a matter for argu-
ment. Analogies for the familiar doctrine that a bona fide pur-
of the payee is often left blank, or there is an indorsement in blank upon
the instrument, and in such cases when the blank is filled up with the
holder's name he would appear to be the original payee or indorsee. In
such cases the holder may show that his ostensible is not his real relation
to the paper; and the want or failure of consideration cannot be pleaded
against him if he show that it has passed through intermediate hands,
and that he is not the immediate promisee of the party making the defense."
40 (1704) 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, § 1.
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chaser of commercial paper may not be subject to defenses to
the promise sued upon must be sought outside the field of con-
tract law. When the courts began to recognize that a bona
fide purchase might strip the obligation of defenses, there were
well known situations in the realm of property law in which
a bona fide purchaser did stand better than his transferor,1
and it would not be surprising if these instances served as guid-
ing analogies. The bill or note, particularly the former, was a
substitute for money which was property, the bona fide pur-
chaser of which was protected against certain infirmities in the
title.12 To this extent, the bill or note was looked upon, not as
the evidence merely of certain promissory undertakings, but as
a piece of property..
If the question were between the parties to the promise, it
was natural that the familiar rules of contract law should apply,
and any infirmity could be relied upon in defense. On the other
-hand, if the enforcement of the promise was sought, not by the
other party thereto, but by a purchaser, the principles of prop-
erty law 43 extending protection to the innocent purchaser were
applicable. Thus we have in so many cases and texts the dis-
cussions of "immediate" and "remote" parties.
In form always and in substance usually, the payee is the
party to whom the maker's or drawer's promises are made. An
instrument -ith a blank for the name of the payee may be issued
to A and after passing through any number of other hands as
the property of each successive party, may be filled in by X with
his own name as payee. While X would appear as the promisee,
the fact is that he has taken as a purchaser and is clearly a
41 That a bona fide purchaser of legal interests should take free of
equitable charges was familiar as was also the common principle of com-
mercial law protecting the innocent purchaser in market overt.
4 - In 2 AmEs, CASES ON BILLS & NoTEs (1881) 860, it is said: "It is a
familiar doctrine of equity that one who purchases a legal title for value
and -without notice, takes the title discharged of all equities to which it
was subject in the hands of his vendor, e. g., a trust, or equitable right to
a reconveyance on the ground of fraud; for an equity, being in its nature
a claim in personaz and not in rcm, can be enforced only against a party
to the transaction in which the equity arises, or some one in privity with
that party. (Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading, § 141.) The trans-
fer of bills and notes, by virtue of their negotiability, is governed by the
same principle."
The following language in the early case of Hussey v. Jacob, 1 Ld. Raym.
87, at 88 (K. B. 1696) is also significant: "So in this principal case,
if the bill of exchange had been afterwards assigned for a valuable con-
sideration, the honesty of this assignment had purged the original canker
and rendered it good enough. As where a fraudulent conveyance is as-
signed upon a valuable consideration, the fraud is purged."
43 Of course, the reason for looking to the field of property law for the
guiding principle is to be found in the appeal of commercial policy, the
circulability of commercial paper.
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remote party. So in the common case of a bill of exchange
procured by a remitter in the name of his creditor, the payee,
though ostensibly a party to the promise, really takes as a pur-
chaser from the remitter, and is, therefore, a remote party. It
is quite evident from the cases that have been herein considered
that this line of distinction was observed, at least prior to the
codifications of the law of negotiable paper.
There are good reasons for extending special protection to
purchasers of commercial paper. The part played by such paper
in the shifting of credits, payments, etc., in the commercial life
,of the country demands that the innocent taker for value shall
normally be protected, as he would be if money were taken in-
stead of a bill or note. But as between the promisor and
promisee, who are dealing directly and as such, the instrument
has not yet become any part of the credit structure and there
is no commercial need for the paper to be likened to money.
Speaking of the contention of counsel in Herdman v. Wheeler it
-was said: 44
. He contends that the rule that one holder of a
negotiable instrument can give a better title to it than he
himself possessed is based upon the view that negotiable instru-
ments are currency, and that it is on their passing from hand
to hand, and not on their coming into being, that negotiable
instruments acquire their special validity in the hands of a holder
in due course. Even if the payee of a note may be a holder in
due course, the question whether he is or not depends upon the
actual state of facts as between him and the maker of the note;
and the contract between the payee and the maker though no
doubt it has some incidents, such, for instance, as days of grace
written into it by the law merchant, yet it is governed more by
the ordinary law of contracts than by the law merchant, and
in particular that the element of negotiability in no way enters
into the contract between maker and payee."
And Channel, J., added:
"There is much to support this argument in the Bills of Ex-
change Act."
That a payee may acquire his rights upon commercial paper
by purchase as well as by promise seems too clear for argument.
The "remitter" transactions are conspicuous. The payee's rights
in these situations are as truly acquired by purchase as if the
instrument were made payable to the order of the remitter and
indorsed by him. The remitter is the owner of the paper before
it comes to the hands of the payee.43 The cases before the
44Supra note 12, at 373-374.
45 See cases involving remitters, supra. Also, see Sutherland State Bank
v. Dial, 103 Neb. 136, 170 N. W. 666 (1919) ; (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
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codifications in England and the United States treating the payee
as a holder in due course were quite uniformly instances of the
payee taking as by purchase, rather than by pronise 0 It is not
easy to point to definite authority that a payee taking directly
as a promisee was not looked upon as a potential holder in due
course, but the language used and the principles relied upon were
quite inconsistent with such result.
With this background, one may approach the question of the
meaning of the legislative language, remembering, of course,
that the statutes were supposed to state existing law. So far as
the English cases are concerned, as pointed out above, against
a payee being a holder in due course under the Bills of Exchange
Act until the recent case of Jones v. TVaring, there were only the
dictum of Lord Russell in Lewis v. Clay and the decision in Hce;d-
man v. Wheeler in which the payee took not as a purchaser but
as a promiseey.4 Before considering the American decisions
under the Negotiable Instruments Law it seems appropriate to
analyze the statutory provisions with a view to determining, if
possible, whether the legislative language leaves any room for
interpretation.
EFFECT OF THE N. I. L.
The statute, in section 52, declares that a "holder in due
course" is a "holder" who has taken the instrument under certain
conditions, the only one important to mention being: "4. That
at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it." That a payee may be a "holder" is left wholly
without doubt by section 191, which provides that "holder"
695. Brummel & Co. v. Enders, 18 Gratt. 873 (Va. 1868) is an interesting
instance of one in form a payee being treated as a purchaser, a defense of
usury being unavailable.46 Looking upon the remitter as the owner, as he is in truth, contem-
plating a sale to the named payee, it would not be an unreasonable view
that such payee who takes in good faith and for value should be accorded
the protection normally associated with holders in due course even though
the instrument omits words of negotiability and is therefore really a non-
negotiable bill or note. Such was the result in some of the cases. See
Armstrong v. Bank, supra note 39; F. & B1. Bank v. Humphrey, aup-a
note 39; Horn v. Fuller, 6 N. H. 511 (1834).
7 If the suggested view that the payee must take as a p'ctuliscr from
one who is or appears to be a prior owner in order to rank as a holder
in due course is accepted, as it was before the Bills of Exchange
Act, then the proviso to section 20, dealing with instruments which after
completion are "negotiated" to holders in due course, upon which Hcrdan
v. Wieeler turned, was properly construed. "Negotiated," as used in the
proviso, was given an interpretation which lead to a decision under the
statute in accord with what it would have been before the Act.
62a
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means "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in posses-
sion of it, or the bearer thereof." So far, then, the language
manifestly would include a payee among those who may be
holders in due course.
But paragraph 4 of section 52, above quoted, speaks of a
negotiation-"That at the time it was negotiated to him," etc.
In the discussions of this subject it has generally been taken for
granted that paragraph 4 lays down a positive requirement that
the instrument must have been "negotiated," and the divergence
of opinion has come thereafter in determining whether an in-
strument in the hands of the payee can be said to have been
"negotiated." It should be observed, however, that while the
first three paragraphs lay down requirements essentially affirma-
tive in character, the fourth paragraph contains a negative re-
quirement-there must have been, on the part of the claimed
holder in due course, no notice of infirmity or defect in the title.
The sting of the paragraph would seem to be in the lack of
notice rather than in the negotiation. If "negotiation" is to be
limited in its meaning to transfers between successive holders,
might not the paragraph under examination be read as follows:
"That at the time it was negotiated to him (if the claimed holder
in due course came by the instrument by negotiation) he had no
notice," etc?
However, if this be not considered a sound view, the next
inquiry is whether under the terms of the statute there may be
a "negotiation" between a maker or drawer and a payee. It is
of course obvious that the question arises normally when the
negotiations for floating or circulating the instrument are con-
ducted through an intermediary. By section 30 "negotiation"
is dealt with. It is there provided that "an instrument is nego-
tiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such
manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof." Our
inquiry under this, then, becomes simply: may one reasonably
say that delivery, for example through an intermediary, to the
payee is a transfer constituting the transferee the holder? As
pointed out above, it is expressly declared by the Act that a
payee may be a holder. How about delivery amounting to a
transfer? Ordinarily we think of the initial delivery of the in-
strument as accomplishing its issuance; but "transfer" is one of
the words used in the statute in defining "delivery." 48 The
language is: " 'Delivery' means transfer of possession, actual or
constructive, from one person to another." To the payee cer-
tainly there is a transfer of possession, actual or constructive.
All this would fairly indicate that issuance of the instrument by
delivery to the payee might well be deemed a "negotiation"; and
no doubt the average business man would not be shocked to be
4 Section 191.
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told that in making "delivery" of his promissory note to the
payee bank which advances the money thereon he has "nego-
tiated" his note.
But there is a second sentence in the makeup of section 30.
It states: "If payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery; if
payable to order it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder
completed by delivery." Here clearly the negotiation of instru-
ments already issued is referred to; and the balance of the
sections in the third article, in which section 30 is the first sec-
tion, equally clearly deal with issued instruments. It is inter-
esting to observe, though, that in section 50, the concluding
section of the third article, issuance, or more specifically reis-
suance, and negotiation are used apparently interchangeably.
The first sentence of section 30 seems to be a broad, general
declaration; the second sentence does not appear by its language
to limit the first, but rather to attempt to provide for two
special types of situations included within the general scope
of the language in the first sentence.
That under the N.I.L. the door is not closed to considering a
payee in an appropriate case as a holder in due course seems
without doubt, particularly when the statute is read, as it must
be, in light of the fact that it purports, generally speaking, to
be only a codification of existing law.
The first case 49 under the N.I.L. involving the question was
one in which the payee took for value and in good faith from
an ostensible remitter. Over defenses based on the improper
filling in of blanks and the diversion of the instrument to non-
intended purposes, the court held the payee a holder in due
course. It was pointed out that at common law - a payee might
occupy such favored position and by the codification in Eng-
land and this country the law in this respect had not been
changed. The court said: 51
In our opinion, a check received by the payee
named in it, in payment of a debt due from the remitter of the
check, is received by a holder in due course within § 69 [52] of
the negotiable instruments act, . . and that is so even if
we should follow the decision made in Herdman V. Wheeler,
[1902] 1 K.B. 361, and hold that a payee never can be a holder
in due course to whom the bill has been 'negotiated,' within the
last clause of § 31 [14] of our act, . . which is taken from
§ 20 of the English bills of exchange act of 1882."
49Boston Steel & Iron Co. v. Steuer, 183 Mass. 140, 06 N. E. 646 (1903).
50 The cases relied upon were Watson v. Russell, supra note 11; Poirer v.
Morris, supra note 10; Munroe v. Bordier, sztpra note 6; Nelson v. Cowing
& Seymour, 6 Hill, 336 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1844); Armstrong v. Bank, mpra
mote 39.
31 Supra note 49, at 144, 66 N. E. at 648.
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Two years later, in Thorpe v. White, 2 the same court held a
payee not subject to the defense of material alteration made by
the maker after the note had been signed by the defendant as an
accommodation indorser and before delivery to the plaintiff
payee. The payee was deemed to have become a "holder" by
negotiation under section 52 (N.I.L.) and a holder in due course
without notice of the alteration under section 124.53 On such
facts it is difficult to see how the payee can be considered as tak-
ing by purchase.
The next case in point of time is one which seems to be,
largely responsible for the line of American authority that a
payee cannot be a holder in due course 4 The payee for value
and in good faith had taken the note involved in that case from
one of three joint makers after it had been filled in, by the
one with whom the payee dealt, with an amount contrary to the
agreement upon which the other makers had signed their names.
The question was whether within the proviso to section 14
(N.I.L.) the note after completion had been "negotiated to a
holder in due course," and it was decided that under the defi-
nitions and provisions found in sections 191, 52, 59 and 57 the
payee here should not be deemed in that favored class. The
court said: 55
"The latter term (holder in due course) seems unquestionably
to be used to indicate a person to whom after completion and
delivery the instrument has been negotiated. In the ordinary
case the payee of the instrument is the person with whom the
contract is made, and his rights are not in general dependent on
any peculiarities in the law of negotiable instruments."
It was carefully pointed out, however, by the court that they did
not want to be understood as taking a position that in no case
could a payee be a holder in due course, and the remitter trans-
action was referred to as one in which both before and since
the statute a payee might be a holder in due course."' The de-
52188 Mass. 333, 74 N. E. 592 (1905).
z; "But when an instrument has been materially altered and is in the
hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration, he may en-
force payment thereof according to its original tenor."
54 Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, 135 Iowa, 350, 112 N. W. 807 (1907). In
Black Hawk Bank v. Monarch Co., 207 N. W. 121 (Ia. 1926) the court said
there was no need, on the facts, to discuss the much mooted question
whether a payee may be a holder in due course.
55 Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, supra note 54, at 353, 354, 112 Pac. at 808..
56 The court cited Watson v. Russell, sup'a note 11, and Armstrong v.
Bank, supra note 39. The case of Boston Steel and Iron Co. v. Steuer
supra note 49, was disapproved because there had been no delivery of the
check to the third party with the intent to make the instrument operative.
It was not to be effective until delivered to the payee. The Iowa court,
however, either overlooks or deems unimportant the fact that the payee in
the Steuer case took the check under circumstances warranting the belief
that the third party was in the position of a remitter.
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cision of the English court in Herdmon v. Wzecler, on facts
essentially the same, was approved.
For the minority though not uncommon view in the American
cases, that a payee need not contend for protection as a holder
in due course, this Iowa decision is largely responsible; at least
it appears to have been the authority commonly relied upon.
In virtually all of the cases cited for the minority view, however,
the payees, as in the Vander Ploeg case, in no true sense took
as purchasers but as promisees in a transaction with the prom-
isors, or one of them, directly or through an agent.5 7 Frequently
in these cases it is said that one cannot become a holder in due
course unless by negotiation from a "holder," and if the tern
is used as defined in the N.I.L., that would mean that not even in
the remitter cases could the payee be a holder in due course.
The expressions, however, are merely dicta. There is very
little,5 8 if any, real authority for the proposition that a payee
who purchases the instrument from one who does not appear
5 Consolidated Wagon & Mlachine Co. v. Housman, 38 Idaho, 343, 221
Pac. 143 (1923) (not even citing Redfield v. Wells, 31 Idaho, 415, 173 Pac.
640 (1918) in which the Steuer case in Massachusetts was expressly ap-
proved) ; Builders' Lime & Cement Co. v. Weimer, 170 Iowa, 444, 151 N. W.
100 (1915); Devoy & Kuhn v. Huttig, 174 Iowa, 357, 156 N. W. 412 (1916);
Southern Nat'l Realty Corp. v. People's Bank, 178 Ky. 80, 198 S. W. 543
(1917); First Nat'l Bank v. Allen, 88 Okla. 162, 212 Pac. 597 (1923)-
Strother v. Wilkinson, 90 Okla. 247, 216 Pac. 436 (1923); Rice v. Jones, 102
Okla. 30, 225 Pac. 958 (1924) ; Britton Milling Co. v. Williams, 44 S. D. 525,
184 N. W. 268 (1921); Tripp State Bank v. Jerke, 45 S. D. 448, 188 N. WN.
314 (1922); Walker v. Traylor Co., 12 Fed. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. Sth,
1926).
In Rice v. Jones, supra, the Oklahoma court, after pointing out the con-
flict of authority and that in the earlier case of First Nat'l Bank v. Allen,
supra, the view that a payee cannot be a holder in due course had been
adopted, supported its conclusion by a novel argument. It was said at
32, 33, 225 Pac. at 960: "The common acceptance of the meaning of the
word 'course' contemplates a sequence of events or a succession of act-
connectedly followed, and a holding that one act or transaction between
maker and payee may be in a 'course? is a strained construction of the
word."
58 St. Charles Savings Bank v. Edwards, 243 Mo. 553, 147 S. W. 978
(1912) may be a case of a payee taking as purchaser from a remitter, but
the case is decided on the ground that the payee in any event was not a
holder in due course, for there was no innocent taking; it was pointed out
that the conclusion would have been the same if the notes had been pay-
able to the intermediate party and by him indorsed aver to the one who
claimed to be an innocent purchaser. In Weller v. Meadows, 272 S. W.
85 (Mo. App. 1925) in which a party was claiming to be a holder in due
course, the court rejected the contention saying, at 90: "In the first place,
he is named as payee in the notes, and, while this is not conclusive, it is an
item in defendant's favor. A holder in due course is one who has tahen
the instrument under the following conditions . . . and this clearly
contemplates that to be a holder in due course the holder must have ac-
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to be a promisor in the instrument itself (in other words, the
two-transaction situation ,of which the remitter case is the com-
mon type) cannot stand as a holder in due course..
If the foregoing analysis of this problem is sound, one would
expect that the cases in which payees were held to be holders in
due course were instances of purchase in what were, or ap-
peared to be, two-transaction situations, as in Boston Steel and
Iron Co. v. Steuer.59 Some of the decisions have been of that
character 60 and occasionally the need for the two-way deal has
been emphasized. For example, in Howard National Bank v.
Wilson,' the court say&:
. . .the cardinal purpose of the principles developed in
the law merchant has been the protection of a bona fide holder
for value who has acquired a negotiable instrument in the due
course of trade or business. Commercial paper serves as com-
mon currency. Its unhampered use is indispensable to the busi-
ness of the modern world. Any medium of exchange cannot
have free currency without confidence; an experience has
taught that it is dangerous to cast doubt even upon a payee's
right to recover'when he has taken commercial paper complete
and regular on its face, honestly and for value. . . . The
only provision of the Act (N.I.L.) even suggesting that it was
intended to exclude a payee in every case from the status of a
holder in due course is found in Section 52, subd. 4; but such
is not its necessary implication. The question turns on the mean-
ing of 'negotiated' as employed in this section. Its common legal
-quired the note by negotiations and transfer from the payee, or prior in-
.dorsee, and not by issue or delivery from the maker."
Washington cases may be cited on each side. Bowles Co. v. Clark, 59
'Wash. 336, 109 Pac. 812 (1910); State Bank v. Pacific Grain Co., 125
'Wash. 149, 215 Pac. 350 (1923); Ladd & Tilton Bank v. Small, 126 Wash.
8, 216 Pac. 82 (1923). In the case last cited, the court (Department 1)
-was of the opinion that a payee could not be a holder in due course, relying
largely on language of Fullerton, J.; in the case in Department 2, that
judge was saying, at 152, 215 Pac. at 351: "It is not the rule that a payee
named in a draft or check can, under no circumstances, be a holder in
due course. We need not point out the many instances where he is such,'t
etc.
In Woods v. Finley, 153 N. C. 497, 69 S. W. 502 (1910), cited occasionally
for the view that one may become a holder in due course only by "nego-
tiation," meaning thereby, if the instrument is an "order" one, by indorse-
ment, the language to that effect was used in respect of a claim by a pos-
sessor of an order note unindorsed by the payee.
59Supra note 49.
60 Drumm Construction Co. v. Forbes, 305 Ill. 303, 137 N. E. 225 (1922);
Bank of Commerce v. Randell, 107 Neb. 332, 186 N. W. 70 (1921) [of.
Hartington Nat'l Bank v. Breslin, 88 Neb. 47, 128 N. W. 659 (1910)];
Brown v. Rowan, 91 Misc. 220, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1098 (City Ct. 1915) ; Berg-
strom v. Ritz-Carlton Co., 171 App. Div. 776, 157 N. Y. Supp. 959 (1st
Dept. 1916) ; Johnston v. Knipe, 260 Pa. 504, 105 Atl. 705 (1918) ; Howard
JNat'l Bank v. Wilson, 96 Vt. 438, 120 Atl. 889 (1923).
61 Supra note 60, at 447, 120 Atl. at 892.
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significance is 'concluded by bargain or agreement.' So, a prom-
issory note, complete as to form and payable to a named person
may be negotiated to that person by being sold to him or taken
by him for value."
But in a considerable number of cases 2 the same result has
been reached though the payee dealt directly with the promisors.
In reaching this conclusion it is said that paper may be "nego-
tiated" to the payee, that word being given "its common legal
significance of concluded by bargain or agreement"; and, there-
fore, that "a promissory note complete as to form and payable
to a named person may be negotiated to that person by being
sold to him or taken by him for value." r3 This is an even
broader view than that entertained by the Pennsylvania court
in Johnston v. Knipe,", in which the question was whether a
a payee who took directly from the maker was to be considered
as a holder in due course as to one who had indorsed at the
request of the maker on the understanding that plaintiff's name
would not be written in as payee. The court considered the case
the same as if the note had been given by the defendant in-
dorser payable to the maker who, in turn, had sold it to the plain-
tiff. "'Even if in certain cases,'" the court said, (quoting the
lower court's opinion) "'a payee is not a holder, in due course,
2 Ex parte Goldberg & Lewis, 191 Ala. 356, 67 So. 839 (1914) ; Baggish
v. Offengand, 97 Conn. :312, 116 Atl. 614 (1922); Thompson v. Bank, U30
Ga. App. 443, 118 S. E. 470 (1923); First Nat'l Bank of Herington v. Bank,
100 Ran. 194, 200, 164 Pac. 137, 139 (1917) (dictum); Thorpe v. White,
svnpra note 52; Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, 217 M1ass. 462, 105 N. E. 005
(1914); Colonial Fur Ranching Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 Mass. 12, 111
N. E. 731 (1917); State Bank v. Missia, 144 Blinn. 410, 175 N. W. 614
(1920) (semble); Merchants Nat1 Bank v. Smith, 59 Mont. 280, 196 Pac.
523 (1921); American Natl Bank v. Kerley, 109 Or. 155, 220 Pac. 116
(1923) (repudiating indication to contrary in Bank of Gresham v. Walch,
76 Or. 272, 147 Pac. 534 (1915); Snyder v. lcEwen, 148 Tenn. 422., 25
S. W. 434 (1923); Security Trust Co. v. Foster, 249 S. W. 227 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923).
£3 Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, supra note 62, at 464, 105 N. E. at G0.
This case involved the application of section 16 of the N.I.L. (section 33
in Massachusetts): ". . . As between immediate parties, and as re-
gards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in
order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the
party making, drawing, accepting or indorsing, as the case may be," etc.
The payee was not necessarily an "immediate" party. The court said that
these words "immediate parties" "must be confined to parties who are 'im-
mediate' to the conditions or limitations placed upon the delivery in the
sense of knowing or being chargeable with notice of them." Liberty Trust
Co. v. Tilton, loc. cit. supra. That this is the true meaning of the words
one may well doubt; the expression "immediate parties" had a well kmown
meaning before the N.I.L. was thought of, and it was not the meaning
the court here entertained.
6 Supra note 60.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
we are of opinion that under the facts before us . . . [the
plaintiff] is such holder.' )165
To say that a payee in the usual case, though he takes for
value, purchases the instrument, is, it is submitted, to misstate
the real nature of the transaction. The value he gives is the
consideration for the promise or promises of those whose paper
it is, not the purchase price. It is then that the instrument be-
gins its commercial life, and as yet there is nothing to which to
apply the doctrines of bona fide purchase. Thereafter it may
be the subject matter of a purchase even by the named payee if
he deals with one actually or apparently the owner thereof. 0
The need for protection of the innocent taker arises, as pointed
out above, not in the inception of the paper but when it is sought
to use it as part of the exchangeable credit of the business world.
Of course if the codifications make it clear that all payees
whether taking as promisees or as purchasers are entitled to
rank as holders in due course if the stipulated requisites such
as taking for value, in good faith, before maturity, etc., are
present, there is no use pointing out that under the common law
such was not the case. Nor would there be any occasion for
recalling that it is the purchaser who presents the case for
needed special protection. It has been pointed out time after
time that the legislation both in England and this country was
intended merely to state existing law. The fact that a number
of courts of distinction have concluded that under the N.I.L. no
payee can be a holder in due course seems strong proof that the
language of the statute is not so clear as to leave no occasion
for interpretation in the light of the previous law on the subject.
Since by the statute payees are holders, and holders are pre-
sumptively holders in due course, is it to be said that every
payee is prima facie a holder in due course? It is conceivable
that such should be the result. But reading the statute in the
light of the common law and remembering that in a very large
percentage of transactions the instrument in its inception comes
to the payee as a promisee and not as a purchaser, would it not
more reasonably be concluded that a payee is not entitled to the
65 Ibid. 509, 105 Atl. at 706.
GG Empire Trust Co. v. Manhattan Co., 97 Misc. 694, 162 N. Y. Supp. 629
(Sup. Ct. 1916), aff'd 180 App. Div. 891, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1093 (1st. Dept.
1917) is interesting and instructive. The payee in a certified check gave
value therefor in a transaction supposedly with an agent of the drawer.
In truth, the pretending agent was a thief. The payee therefore did not
purchase the paper from one even an apparent owner; it supposed it was
taking the instrument from the drawer, that the transaction in which it
acquired the paper was its inception. The court held the payee, though
an innocent taker for value, not a holder in due course, because the check
had not begun its commercial life before the payee took it.
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presumption unless it first appears that he took by purchase? G-
After all, whether a payee is a holder in due course is a ques-
tion not susceptible of a categorical answer. In each instance
the conclusion should depend upon the type of situation pre-
sented. No doubt, prima facie, a payee is not a holder in due
course because presumptively he took the instrument as prom-
isee rather than as a purclaser. But it always should be open
to proof that he really acquired the paper in the latter capacity,
in which event his status may be that of a due course holder.
67 In Talbot v. Von Boris, supra note 33, an action by the payee, one of
the makers defended on the ground that her co-maker procured her sig-
nature by duress, and it was argued that the duress being shown it then
became incumbent upon the plaintiff to assume the burden of proof that
he had taken for value, in good faith, and without notice. Section 30,
sub-s. 2 of the Bills of Exchange Act (section 59, N..L.) was relied upon.
The court thought that the plaintiff in any event had probably satisfied
that burden. As to the interpretation of the statutory provision, the view
of the judges is well indicated by the following language by Farwell, L. J.,
at 865: "The only other point is as to the construction of s. 230, sub-s. 2,
of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882. I agree with Vaughan Williams L. J.
that up to a certain point in that sub-section the language is such as might
include the payee originally advancing money to the maker of a promis-
sory note as in the present case. The hypothesis upon which the sub-sec-
tion proceeds is that the original issue of the negotiable instrument is
affected with fraud or duress, or illegality, i. e., that the person who
originally took the instrument is in some way affected by his own mis-
conduct, so as to vitiate the instrument in his hands. In that case the
effect of the sub-section clearly is that a subsequent holder cannot enforce
the instrument unless he can shew that, subsequently to the alleged fraud
or illegality by which the issue of the instrument is affected, he gave value
in good faith for the instrument; but the language of the sub-section does
not seem to me to be consistent with its provisions being applicable as be-
tween the parties to the original transaction by which money was bor-
rowed and lent upon the notes."
In Colonial Fur Ranching Co. v. Bank, su'pra note 62, there is some very
general language indicating an opinion that any payee is prima facie a
holder in due course. In McLaughlin v Paine Furniture Co., 245 Mass.
377, 139 N. E. 542 (1923) a payee in a remitter transaction was held en-
titled to the presumption, according to N.I.L., § 59. And in Howard Nat'l
Bank v. Wilson, supra note 60, at 449, 120 Ati. at 893, where the same re-
sult was reached, the language of the court ("The note was procured by
Elliott for his personal accommodation, and was made payable to the
plaintiff with a view to securing the loan from it, a stranger to the trans-
action") indicates a viewing of the payee as a purchaser.
